Federal lawmakers are considering legislation that could result in millions more middleincome families obtaining health insurance from government. Unfortunately, the debate over expansion of the State Children's Health Insurance Program is divorced from the reality of who truly needs assistance and the forces that are making health insurance increasingly unaffordable.
SCHIP and its larger sibling Medicaid currently enroll many people who do not need government assistance, including some families of four earning up to $72,000 per year. That is a direct result of federal funding rules that reward states for making more Americans dependent on government for their health care.
Rather than expand SCHIP, Congress should (1) make private health insurance more affordable by allowing consumers and employers to purchase less expensive policies from other states, and (2) fold federal Medicaid and SCHIP funding into block grants that no longer encourage states to open taxpayer-financed health care to nonneedy families. With more Americans able to afford private insurance and no incentive for states to expand government programs beyond the truly needy, federal and state governments could reduce spending on those programs.
Introduction
Federal lawmakers are considering legislation that could result in millions more middle-income families obtaining health insurance from government. Congress created the State Children's Health Insurance Program in 1997. That program provides federal grants to states that provide federally defined health insurance coverage to eligible children. 1 In 2006, SCHIP spent approximately $8 billion to cover 7.4 million individuals. 2 SCHIP's original goal was to provide health insurance to children whose family income is too high to qualify for Medicaid yet too low to afford private health insurance. Medicaid is the much larger federal-state health insurance program targeted presumably at the poorest Americans. Medicaid spends far more than SCHIP (see Figure 1 ) and covers 60.9 million people. 3 SCHIP has grown well beyond its original purpose. The program currently enrolls 6.6 million children, 4 many from families that are neither needy nor even low-income. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that maintaining existing SCHIP benefits for the next five years would require an additional $8 billion of federal funding above and beyond existing funding levels. 5 President Bush has proposed increasing spending by $5 billion over five years. 6 Democrats in Congress have proposed increasing federal SCHIP spending by as much as $60 billion over five years, 7 which would allow states to open SCHIP to far more non-needy families.
Expanding SCHIP or even maintaining current enrollment levels would force taxpayers to finance health insurance for many families who are capable of obtaining it themselves. A better strategy for providing health care to those in need would use deregulation to make private health insurance more affordable for middle-and low-income families, thereby allowing government health programs to focus on those patients who most need assistance. This paper proposes a twopart strategy for improving health care access: (1) Indeed, a cottage industry of Medicaid estate planners exists to help middle-class seniors spend Medicaid funds, rather than their own resources, on their nursing home care. 9 Other Medicaid enrollees come from non-elderly families that could obtain health insurance on their own. More than one out of every five people eligible for Medicaid actually has private health insurance, 10 suggesting that Medicaid's eligibility criteria are overly broad.
Likewise, SCHIP has grown well beyond its original purpose of providing health insurance to children unable to obtain private insurance but too affluent to qualify for Medicaid. When Congress created SCHIP in 1996, more than 60 percent of eligible children already had private health insurance.
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In 2005, about 55 percent of SCHIP-eligible children had private health insurance. 12 Depending on the state, SCHIP now provides health insurance to children in families earning up to 350 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) or more. 13 For a family of four, that is the equivalent of nearly $72,000 per year.
14 New York wants to increase its SCHIP eligibility cutoff to 400 percent of the FPL, 15 or roughly $82,000 per year for a family of four. 16 Nationwide, an estimated 89 percent of children in families earning between 300 percent and 400 percent of the FPL already have private coverage. 17 As a basis for comparison, median family income for all families in 2005 was just over $56,000. 18 That suggests that if all states raised their eligibility cutoff to New York's proposed level, well over half of all families could enroll their children in a government health program. Finally, SCHIP also enrolls some 670,000 adults. 19 As a result of past Medicaid and SCHIP expansions, the share of children eligible for those programs rose from less than one fifth in 1987 to nearly one half in 2002. 20 That is, despite the fact that the share of children living in poverty actually fell over the same period (see Figure 2) . 21 Medicaid and SCHIP eligibility criteria are broader than what would be necessary to cover only those who truly need assistance.
A Deeper Low-Wage Trap
A frequently overlooked downside of Medicaid and SCHIP is that government programs targeting those below a given income threshold create disincentives for beneficiaries to increase their earnings. As a lowincome family's earnings rise, the family pays higher taxes and loses Medicaid, SCHIP, and other government benefits. The combination of higher taxes and lost subsidies means that when a family increases its earnings by $100, its total income rises by only a small fraction of that amount. In many instances, a family Figure 3 shows what happens if that hypothetical mother increases her earnings. The combination of progressively higher taxes and the progressive loss of government subsidies means that even if she increases her earnings from about $15,000 to $45,000, her net income remains the same at about $40,000.
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Of the $30,000 she adds to her earnings, she loses $4,000 to taxes and $26,000 to reduced benefits. As a result of programs such as SCHIP, low-income families in New Mexico and other states face marginal effective tax rates that can exceed 100 percent. Such families have almost no financial incentive to achieve self-sufficiency, because increasing their earnings often has zero effect on their actual income.
Expanding SCHIP would magnify those powerful disincentives to increase family earnings and would ensnare even more families in what economists call the "low-wage trap"
25 created by such programs. That low-wage trap would be deepened further because Medicaid and SCHIP increase health care prices for private purchasers. For example, Medicaid price controls increase the cost of prescription drugs for private payers by an estimated 13 percent.
26 Government purchasing through Medicaid and SCHIP also can increase prices for private purchasers through what is commonly believed to be "cost shifting," but may be more accurately described as crowding out private purchasers. 
Figure 2 Percent of Children Eligible for Government Health Insurance vs. Living in Poverty
would make financial independence more difficult even for those who do not enroll.
Poor Fiscal Sense
Expanding SCHIP also would be fiscally unwise. First, expanding coverage may not be the best way to improve the health of targeted children. Although policymakers expect that expanding Medicaid and SCHIP will improve children's health, economists have found no evidence that these programs are a cost-effective way of doing so. Economists Helen Levy and David Meltzer write:
It is clear that expanding health insurance is not the only way to improve health. . . . Policies could also be aimed at factors that may fundamentally contribute to poor health, such as poverty and low levels of education. There is no evidence at this time that money aimed at improving health would be better spent on expanding insurance coverage than on any of these other possibilities.
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In a survey of economic studies examining factors that contribute to longevity, the New York Times reported that education appears to have the greatest impact, while "factors that are popularly believed to be crucialmoney and health insurance, for example, pale in comparison." 29 According to RAND Corporation health economist James Smith, health insurance "is vastly overrated in the policy debate" over how to increase life expectancy.
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One reason that Medicaid and SCHIP may not be cost-effective vehicles for improving health is that expanding those programs reduces private health insurance coverage. Families often substitute Medicaid and SCHIP for private coverage. Similarly, employers often cut or eliminate health benefits when their workers become eligible for those programs. It is well-established that Medicaid and SCHIP "crowd out" private health insurance. 31 Crowd-out makes expansion of public programs a costly way of increasing the number of people with health insurance. A recent To illustrate, suppose that Congress and the states were to enroll 10 million additional people in Medicaid or SCHIP. As a result, the number of people with private health insurance would decline by about 6 million. Though taxpayers would be financing health care for an additional 10 million people, the number of uninsured would fall only by 4 million. In other words, Medicaid and SCHIP cover four uninsured people for the price of 10. Crowd-out is more likely to occur when lawmakers open these programs to higherincome families, because those families are more likely to have private health insurance already.
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Expanding SCHIP also makes poor fiscal sense because spending on Medicaid and SCHIP is already on an unsustainable path. Cato Institute senior fellow Jagadeesh Gokhale estimates that maintaining existing Medicaid growth rates would require implausibly high tax rates in the future. According to Gokhale, "Limiting Medicaid spending growth is . . . an essential component of putting the federal budget on a sustainable course without imposing crushing tax burdens on younger and future generations." 34 Nevertheless, lawmakers appear ready to let the poorest Americans carry the burden of a SCHIP expansion. Congress is considering financing a SCHIP expansion with a 156-percent increase in the federal cigarette tax, from 39 cents to $1 per pack. 35 According to Harvard economist Kip Viscusi:
Cigarette taxes fall predominantly on the very poor. The usual concerns about regressive taxes involve those that are regressive in percentage terms, that is, the poor pay a higher percentage of their income in taxes than do the wealthy. Cigarette taxes are actually so regressive that the poor pay a much higher absolute level of taxes than do the wealthy. In 1990, people who made under $10,000 per year paid almost twice as much in cigarette taxes as those who made $50,000 and above. 36 An increase in the cigarette tax would force the poorest Americans to subsidize health insurance for families earning up to $82,000 per year.
Moreover
Today, 200 cases of cigarettes in a modest-sized transport truck would have a retail value in New York City of around $1 million and would be [a] tempting target for thieves. 37 Increasing the federal cigarette tax would create an even greater incentive for armed thieves to rob retailers and hijack cigarette trucks.
Why Do Medicaid and SCHIP Cover Non-Needy
Families?
Medicaid and SCHIP cover many nonneedy families as a result of the incentives that the federal government creates for state governments. Overall, 57 percent of Medicaid spending comes from the federal treasury, with 43 percent coming from states. 38 Much as it did under the old Aid to Families with Dependent Children cash assistance program, the federal government "matches" every dollar a state puts toward its Medicaid program with at least one dollar from the federal treasury. 40 Since states pay only a fraction of the cost of expanding Medicaid to non-needy families, the Medicaid "match" encourages such expansions. Like the former AFDC program, Medicaid's funding mechanism creates a "pay-for-dependence" incentive, rewarding states that increase the number of Americans dependent on government.
The states' openended entitlement to federal dollars-or more precisely, to the earnings of taxpayers in other states-likewise increases the damage that Medicaid does to private markets.
As with Medicaid, the federal government matches state outlays for SCHIP, though at higher rates. Overall, 69 percent of SCHIP spending comes from the federal treasury, with 31 percent coming from the states. 41 At a minimum, the federal SCHIP "match" allows states to triple their money. In some cases, states with a high proportion of low-income uninsured children can nearly quintuple their SCHIP outlays. 42 Unlike Medicaid, the federal government caps its contribution to each state's SCHIP program at a pre-determined amount, which ostensibly denies states an open-ended entitlement to the earnings of taxpayers in other states.
Nevertheless, the cap on federal SCHIP allotments is not as binding as it might appear. States such as Georgia sometimes spend all of their allotted SCHIP funds before the end of the fiscal year. The CBO estimates that 11 states will do so in 2007. 43 Typically, those states then petition the federal government for additional funding. 44 So far, Congress has twice bailed out such states, 45 effectively rewarding states that commit to spend more federal dollars than they have been allotted.
Given federal funding rules, states have little incentive to tailor Medicaid or SCHIP to cover only the truly needy. Instead, they face rather large incentives to expand those programs to people who do not need assistance.
Refocus Aid on the Truly Needy
Congress should apply the same solution to SCHIP and Medicaid that it applied to AFDC in 1996. Reforming SCHIP and Medicaid as Congress reformed welfare would reduce dependence on government and encourage states to focus government health care programs on those who truly need assistance.
As with AFDC, Congress should end the federal entitlement to Medicaid benefits and stop funding state Medicaid and SCHIP programs with matching grants. As with AFDC, Congress should replace those matching grants with one block grant that neither increases nor decreases with the size of a state's health care programs. As with AFDC, Congress should place as few restrictions as possible on how states spend their block grants. Congress should give states the flexibility to spend those funds at the state's discretion on a few broad goals, such as:
1. Targeting medical assistance to the truly needy, including the uninsurable; 2. Reducing dependence; and 3. Reducing crowd-out of private effort, including charitable care.
As with AFDC, Congress should freeze the overall amount it transfers to state health care programs at current Medicaid and SCHIP levels. If Congress were to freeze the new block grants at 2007 levels, much as it did with welfare reform, that would produce a savings of $1.1 trillion over 10 years. 46 
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States face rather large incentives to expand Medicaid and SCHIP to people who do not need assistance.
The most crucial element of the blockgrant approach is that states could not obtain additional federal funding by expanding their programs. That feature would discourage states from expanding government aid to individuals who could obtain health insurance on their own. Block grants would allow each state to preserve its Medicaid and SCHIP programs just as they exist today. States that wish to expand their programs could continue to do so. However, states would have to pay for such expansions themselves, rather than have taxpayers in other states shoulder the burden. That would encourage each state to focus its programs on the truly needy. Over time, states would learn from each other's experiments at providing efficient care to those who truly need assistance.
It makes little sense for residents of the 50 states to send their money to Washington, DC, only to have Washington send that money back to the states. Moreover, it is arguably unconstitutional. The U.S. Constitution does not grant Congress the power to provide health care to the needy. Under the Tenth Amendment, such "powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution . . . are reserved to the states." 47 Converting federal Medicaid and SCHIP funding to block grants would do more than simply limit the growth of government health care programs. Block grants would take a step toward a more sound and constitutional means of providing health care for the needy, where the money never passes through Congress's hands.
Opponents will predict that block grants would reduce access to care and increase the number of uninsured. Opponents of welfare reform made similar predictions, which turned out to be inaccurate. When Congress pared back cash assistance, welfare caseloads plummeted and poverty decreased-often dramatically-in every category. The poverty rate remains lower today than at any point in the 17 years leading up to 1996. 48 Many who opposed welfare reform have since admitted that it accomplished a large measure of good.
There are indications that a block-grant approach to Medicaid and SCHIP could produce similar results. When the 1996 welfare reform law eliminated Medicaid benefits for noncitizen immigrants, opponents predicted that coverage levels among noncitizen immigrants would drop. Instead, coverage levels increased because more noncitizen immigrants obtained private health insurance. 49 That experience supplies evidence that private health insurance coverage expands in response to a reduction in government coverage-sometimes enough to overwhelm the reduction in government coverage. Medicaid block grants were part of the original 1996 welfare reform law until they were dropped at the insistence of President Clinton. Congress should revive the idea to rededicate government health care spending to those who truly need assistance.
Affordable Coverage via Competitive Federalism
Another reason states have been eager to expand their Medicaid programs has been the rising cost of private health insurance. State health insurance regulations have been a driving force behind that trend.
The average state requires consumers to purchase 38 separate types of coverage. 50 Forty-five states require all consumers, even teetotalers, to purchase coverage for alcoholism treatment. Thirty states require consumers to pay for contraceptive coverage and 13 states require consumers to pay for coverage of in-vitro fertilization-even though many consumers, such as some Catholics, find those services morally objectionable. Those coverage mandates increase the cost of private health insurance by as much as 15 percent. 51 An estimated 25 percent of the uninsured lack coverage due to the cost of mandatory coverage laws. 52 Underwriting restrictions such as "community rating" laws, a type of price control, further increase the cost of private health insurance for many low-income families, and likewise increase the number of uninsured. 53 Such regulations price many low-
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Block grants would take a step toward a more sound and constitutional means of providing health care for the needy, where the money never passes through Congress's hands.
income families out of the market for private health insurance. As many as 75 percent of the uninsured could afford to purchase health insurance 54 but find that the available options are not worth the high cost of coverage.
Many individuals and employers who purchase health insurance cannot avoid the unwanted costs imposed by such regulations. Under each state's licensing laws, every health insurance policy sold in that state must include state-mandated coverage and comply with the state's price controls.
Given the wide variation in health insurance regulation from state to state 55 and the availability of lower-cost policies in some states, 56 many consumers and employers should be able to obtain lower-cost health insurance in other states, just as they purchase many other products from out-of-state. However, state licensing laws act as a barrier to trade, preventing many Americans from obtaining lower-cost health insurance. The burden of these laws falls hardest on lowincome individuals; 75 percent of the uninsured have family incomes below 200 percent of the federal poverty level (about $41,000 per year for a family of four).
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A Health Insurance
Free-Trade Zone
Congress should sweep away those trade barriers and let individuals and employers purchase health insurance licensed in states other than their own. Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power "To regulate Commerce . . . among the several states." That power exists primarily to prevent each state from erecting barriers to commerce from other states. 58 Congress should enact a federal law that prevents states from barring the sale of an insurance product licensed by another state.
Such a law would enable many lowincome, uninsured consumers to obtain private health insurance, because it would expand their range of choices to include policies free of unwanted regulatory costs. The consumer protections required by the licensing state, such as financial solvency requirements, could be incorporated into the insurance contract. That would allow the purchaser to enforce those requirements in the purchaser's home state, with the help of his state's insurance regulators.
This "competitive federalism" 59 approach would improve the quality of health insurance regulation. Giving consumers the freedom to avoid unwanted regulatory costs would force states to offer only the regulatory protections that consumers demand. Otherwise, consumers would take their business-and, importantly, their premium taxes-to a state that provides consumer-friendly regulation. Competition among the states would drive insurance regulation toward an equilibrium-or multiple equilibria-between too much and too little regulation. States would be unlikely to engage in a "race to the bottom" by eliminating important consumer protections: the first people to be injured by such unwise regulatory policies would be the voters in that very state, who would then punish the responsible officials. 60 Competitive federalism would be a far preferable means of making health insurance affordable to low-income consumers than federal preemption of state regulation. 61 First, competitive federalism preserves each state's power to determine its health insurance regulations. Second, competitive federalism preserves each individual's freedom to choose the protections they demand. Third, and most importantly, competitive federalism would maintain constant pressure on states not to enact costly regulations, because consumers could choose policies licensed by other states.
If Congress were to preempt state health insurance regulations, however, that would effectively federalize the regulation of health insurance. 62 Over time, at the behest of special interests, Congress would enact costly regulation after costly regulation, just as state legislatures have. 63 Those regulations would apply nationwide, meaning that consumers-particularly low-income consumers-would have no escape.
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Costly state regulations price many low-income families out of the market for private health insurance.
Competitive federalism also would be a far preferable means of making health insurance affordable to low-income consumers than expanding SCHIP. Unlike SCHIP, competitive federalism would require no government spending and no tax increases. It would not pull more families into a low-wage trap. Indeed, competitive federalism would help low-income families avoid dependence on government. Competitive federalism would not increase the cost of privately purchased health care. If anything, by enabling a more competitive health insurance market, it would force insurers to put more downward pressure on health care prices. Finally, because competitive federalism would help more low-income families become independent, it would allow state governments to focus their health care programs on those who truly need assistance.
SCHIP's Bootleggers and Baptists
With so many reasons not to expand SCHIP-including a lack of evidence on costeffectiveness and the availability of better alternatives for making coverage affordable for low-income families-why is there so much support for expanding means-tested government health insurance to people who don't need charity? Support for SCHIP (and Medicaid) expansion comes from an alliance of "bootleggers and Baptists." Economists often explain support for government policies (e.g., restrictions on alcohol sales) in terms of those who truly believe in the merits of the policy (i.e., Baptists who oppose alcohol consumption) and those who benefit financially from the policy (i.e., the bootleggers who sell illicit alcohol). 64 The "Baptists" behind SCHIP expansion are those who believe that the way to increase health care quality and access is for government to finance and control the delivery of care. An example would be left-wing advocacy groups such as Families USA. 65 The "bootleggers" behind SCHIP expansion include those who stand to gain financially from greater government subsidies for health insurance and health care. They include several lobbying groups: America's Health Insurance Plans, and the insurers it represents; 67 the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America and the drug manufacturers it represents; the American Medical Association and the physicians it represents; and the Federation of American Hospitals and the for-profit hospitals it represents. 68 State officials who support SCHIP expansion, such as California's Governor Schwarzenegger 69 and the rest of the National Governors Association, 70 also belong in the bootleggers category because increasing federal SCHIP spending benefits them politically: it enables them to provide new subsidies to voters at a fraction of the cost.
Conclusion
The debate over expansion of the State Children's Health Insurance Program is divorced from the reality of who truly needs assistance and the forces that are making health insurance increasingly unaffordable. Congress should refocus government aid on the truly needy, while allowing markets to reduce their number. Deregulating health insurance via competitive federalism would make coverage affordable for more low-income consumers, thereby reducing the demand for government health care programs. Eliminating the financial incentives that reward states for making more Americans dependent on 
